The recently published report on the crash of the Polish Presidential flight to Smolensk in April last year makes very sorry reading. Not just because of the loss of life but also because of the many systemic failures it exposes. The English language version can be found here.
In this short article I don’t want to comment on all the organisational, political and diplomatic issues which this accident has highlighted. They definitely need to be resolved (and I hope they are) as we gradually leave behind the ‘baggage’ left from the mindset of the old Warsaw Pact military environment. Instead, I have been musing on the nature and responsibilities of the pilot in command.
Most of us have had the good fortune to work in organisations where there has been good regulatory oversight, clear managerial responsibilities, good standard operating procedures, and good selection and training of aircrews. But even then, the holes in the Swiss cheese can sometimes all line up. This is where the operating crew and, in particular, the pilot in command is the last line of defence.
In the crash of the Polish Presidential flight much has been made of the presence of the Chief of the Polish Air force on the flight deck. But such pressures are not confined to the circumstances of this accident. There have been many occasion, in all countries and in all societal backgrounds, where having VIPs on board has placed increased pressure on the commander of the aircraft. Adherence to schedule, the critical timings and importance of the occasion, the presence of senior officials (airline or military) and the high visibility from media attention all increase the desire to have everything go perfectly to plan.
BUT – we all know that the weather and technical problems are no respecters of rank or importance, and this is where the commander comes in. Even after every detail and preparation has been covered, things can still go wrong. However well one is trained, and however experienced one may be, the psychological pressure is considerable.
BUT – professional judgement must still prevail. SOPs must still be followed, rules and regulations must not be broken, and if ‘bent’, only within the scope of a thorough knowledge of the background to those rules.
When making direct operational decisions the organisation must permit, and aviation professionals must be able, to isolate themselves from the influence of the power structures within which they have to do their jobs. These influences are numerous and subtle. They range, at one end of the spectrum, from the direct order of a superior (senior officer or senior manager) to the subtle influences of commercial pressure at the other. And such influences are not easy to deal with.
Depending on the ethos of the organisation in which the commander is working these influences can be supportive or destructive. One of the most difficult decisions any commander has to make is when to say ‘Stop’. For example a general in the field deciding when and how to make a strategic withdrawal, an expedition leader deciding when to retreat from a mountain, or the pilot in command deciding not to take off in the face of a thunderstorm or deciding to break off an approach and divert to an alternate airfield in the face of bad weather.
I don’t want to overestimate the difficulties of such decisions, because they are made successfully every day. But I do want to emphasise two things.
The first is the ethos of the organisation within which these decisions are made, whether it be civilian or military. There has to be a clear structure of rules and responsibilities. And there has to be a clear statement of support for commanders who exercise good judgement. When, in the past, I congratulated new captains on gaining their commands I always emphasised that they were the ‘long stop’ (an English cricketing term) when all the other safety nets had failed, i.e. when the holes in the Swiss cheese had all lined up. This was where the captain’s knowledge, professionalism and instincts came into play. And if a captain decided to say ‘Stop’ he/she should do so in the full knowledge that the airline would support them – even if the decision was wrong but made with the best of intentions within the limited knowledge available at the time.
If we leave aside the exceptional pressures that may apply on a VIP flight, all airlines should respect the legal responsibilities placed upon the pilot in command for the safety of the flight. Of course airlines have every right to educate captains about the commercial realities of airline operations, and of course captains should make sensible commercial decisions – after all an aircraft is a moneymaking machine. But equally airlines need to understand the loneliness of command, and respect it.
The second prerequisite is to have commanders who are not only well trained, BUT – who also have the independence of mind and strength of character to say ‘Stop’ AND know that they will have the full backing of their organisation.
The pilot in command of the aircraft is the captain, and has the sole responsibility for the safety of the flight, whether or not he has on board the Director of Flight Operations, the CEO, the Commander-in-Chief, or the Head of State. The responsibility is has and his alone. He needs both the courage to make the right decision and the peace of mind from knowing that he has the support of the organisation which employs him.
This story has captivated my attention and I often refer to it when I am lecturing to a class. It’s a typical example of how the best trained professionals can be pressured into compromising the very standards that they have become known for. We all must be reminded of the need for fortitude in the face of the very people who hire us to do a professional job. It only takes one compromise in the right circumstances for tragedy to occur. I solemnly hope that this is a learning lesson for all the aviation professionals out there.