The Great SID/STAR Phraseology Fiasco

Most of us find the workings of ICAO pretty strange. The constant repetition of States’ sovereignty, with its assumption that they actually know what they are talking about, is quaint, rather than obviously dangerous. The glacial speed of progress, with timescales measured in years for quite minor textual changes, can be exasperating, but nothing is quite as baffling to me as this extraordinary saga of the change to the SID /STAR phraseology.
It may be that there are some out there who have not come across this piece of upside down logic, so here is a quick summary. For years (since Pontius was a pilot) the basic rule concerning clearances involving a change of level, was that the new clearance cancels the old. So if the previous descent clearance was to, say, ‘FL150 level 20 miles south of X’ and the next clearance received was just ‘FL 100’, this cancels the requirement to be at FL 150 20 miles south of X. If ATC still want you to observe that restriction, they must repeat it with the new clearance. The exact wording is (note the six levels of paragraph nesting!):

Clear? You’d think so. You might also think that this was a rather important understanding. So what are to make of the following in the current version of Doc 4444, PANS ATM, Amendment 15 dated November 2007, which given ICAO’s normal pace must have been discussed for a solid three years previously?

Translated into everyday speak, this means that if you are flying a SID with say an initial cleared level of 6000ft (you can tell I am familiar with London…) and ATC clear you to FL 110, under this rule you have to maintain 6000ft,  until the end of the SID profile, wherever that is, unless you are told otherwise. This is of course the opposite of what you would do at any other time. What the ATCO meant you to do was to climb immediately to FL110

When the time came to implement this in the UK, there was uproar. Pilots didn’t like newly introduced anomaly, and London TMA ATC weren’t exactly enchanted with having to add ‘Restriction SID XXX cancelled’ to nearly every clearance they gave.
I regret I haven’t kept a diary with the exact number and timing of changes of mind the UK has had since Amendment 15 hit the streets. I think it is three, initially trying to comply, then, after the outcry, reverting to the status quo ante, and then realising that being the odd one out introduces its own problems, and coming up with a sort of compromise. If I understand the current Flight Ops Communication 09/2010, UK ATCOs have to remember to add ‘now’ to a climb or descent clearance that is meant to be done without observing the SID/STAR restrictions. This is at least shorter than the ‘official’ version, but it remains a difference. And, as the FOC says, there is still confusion in the rest of the world with some States following ICAO, (the bloody sovereignty thing again), some not, and some, er, don’t know. What pilots are meant to do in this mess, is frankly beyond me.
The first question that comes to mind looking at this sorry tale is obviously how could it happen? Rumour has it that the change was cooked up, I expect for reasons that were perfectly sensible to them, by a small group of European ATCOs. But then how was it that ALL the States, duly informed by a State Letter, failed to observe the obvious anomaly it introduced? Or was it that everyone did comment but ICAO ignored them, or what? As anyone involved in aviation regulation knows, it is hard enough to follow the mass of small changes coming out of Montreal, let alone ensure that the right people review them; it is hard to interest operational people in something happening in six months time, as they are typically totally submerged in today’s problems often incurred yesterday.
This is not a totally isolated example – at roughly the same time major changes to the ILS sensitive areas were proposed by an expert group, but fortunately some operationally savvy people got to see it before release and realised that the effect on LVPs would be disastrous, it’s back under discussion now.
But the interesting aspect of this story is the light it shines on the different way that pilots and controllers see the world. At the risk of stating the blindingly obvious, pilots move around, ATCOs don’t. The temptation  among ATCOs is to refine their procedures to improve safety and reduce their workload (often considered equivalent) without worrying too much about what happens in neighbouring Centres; Pilots, however, experience these differences, be they major or minor, as absolute pains in the b*m.  Having to remember different local procedures as you speed through FIRs at the rate of one every 10 minutes, is simply not conducive to safety, and probably not possible. I really don’t mind how ATCOs organise things among themselves; I don’t care if they communicate by exchanging messages written on paper darts thrown across the control room in one centre or by jungle drum in another,  but when it comes to the interface between them and us pilots, I just wish they would try to keep it standard, and do the same as their neighbours.